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ABSTRACT 
There have been several key moments in immigration reform in the United States since 
the 1960s, starting with major change in immigration policy that took place under President 
Johnson in 1965. This paper will examine two key moments of successful reform in US history - 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act.  In recent times however, Americans have seen the failure of Congress to enact immigration 
reform, and the use by Presidents Obama and Trump of executive authority in order to bring 
about any sort of changes. Consequently, this paper will also examine one key moment of 
unsuccessful reform effort of the US Congress to enact immigration reform - the Border 
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.   
I will argue that increased political polarization in American politics and in Congress, is 
largely responsible for this country’s failure to address comprehensive immigration reform 
today. Using qualitative analysis and the partisan polarization theoretical framework posited by 
Alan I. Abramowitz, this paper will undertake a comparative case study approach to examine the 
underlying factors that appear to have influenced the lack of immigration reform in the United 
States in recent times. These include partisan polarization, bipartisanship, and public attitudes. 
The paper assesses the factors seemingly responsible for the success, or failure of immigration 
reform at each of these three key points in time – 1965, 1986, and 2013.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 An April 2017 public opinion poll by the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings 
revealed that in total, 50% of Americans agree strongly or somewhat that “The United States is a 
nation of immigrants, one with a long history of taking in those fleeing persecution in their home 
countries.” 32% disagree strongly or somewhat, and 17% neither agree nor disagree with the 
statement.  Additionally, this poll reported that 79% of Democrats and 21% of Republicans agree 
strongly or somewhat with this statement, while 59% Republicans disagree strongly or 
somewhat, and only 9% Democrats disagree strongly/somewhat.1 
 
Table 1 shows respondents’ levels of agreement/disagreement with the statement that the United 
States is a nation of immigrants, one with a long history of taking in those fleeing persecution in 
their home countries. 
 Percentage of 
Republicans 
Percentage of 
Democrats 
Percentage of 
Independents 
Total Percentage 
Agree 
strongly/somewhat 
21 
 
79 44 50 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
18 12 27 17 
Disagree 
strongly/somewhat 
59 9 26 32 
Source: Brookings Institution Reports 
                                               
     1 Shibley Telhami, “American attitudes on President Trump’s early policies,” Brookings Institution Reports; 
Washington, (May 2017): 36-37. 
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Furthermore, a Brookings Religion, Values and Immigration reform survey administered 
in 2014 reported that overall, most Americans believe the immigration system in the United 
States is broken. Less than 1-in-10 (6%) Americans believe that the immigration system is 
generally working, while 31% say it is working but with some major problems. Nearly four-in-
ten (38%) Americans report that the current immigration system is broken but working in some 
areas, while 23% say it is completely broken. Notably, more than two-thirds (67%) of 
Republicans say that the immigration system is mostly, or completely broken compared to 62% 
of independents and 54% of Democrats. Majorities of all major religious groups believe the 
current immigration system is broken, including more than 6-in-10 white Catholics (67%), white 
mainline Protestants (67%), minority Protestants (64%), white evangelical Protestants (63%), the 
religiously unaffiliated (61%) and 56% of Catholics overall.2   
This data indicates that Americans across both parties seem rather ideologically divided 
on whether or not the United States is an immigrant nation. Additionally, this data is indicative 
of the level of polarization regarding immigration among the electorate in the United States, as it 
also reveals that a significant number of the population do not believe America is an immigrant 
nation. Furthermore, others are unsure, or undecided which indicates that public attitudes may 
not be very responsive to efforts at immigration reform. It is also clear from this data that more 
Democrats believe the United States is a nation of immigrants, while more Republicans believe it 
is not. Moreover, most Americans believe the current immigration system is broken, which 
suggests that they believe something needs to be done to address the issue of immigration in 
                                               
     2 Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, Juhem Navarro-Rivera, E.J. Dionne, Jr., and William A. Galston. What Americans 
Want from Immigration Reform in 2014. Findings from the PRRI/Brookings Religion, Values and Immigration 
Reform Survey, Panel Call Back. Public Religion Research Institute, 2014: 16. 
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America. Again, these figures reveal that Republicans are more likely than Democrats, or 
Independents to believe the immigration system is mostly, or completely broken. Interestingly, 
the religiously unaffiliated are as inclined as members of the major religious groups to believe 
that the current immigration system is broken.  
The data revealed in these polls indicate that immigration is a divisive issue in the United 
States creating opposition among religious groups, political groups, and the general public.  In 
fact, Benjamin Marquez and John F. Witte argue that, “the issue of immigration has been 
relevant to American politics for over 200 years, and for most of those years it has produced 
significant controversies, often pitting powerful interests against one another.”3 Those 
controversies included prohibitions on certain races and nationalities. The United States 
Naturalization Law of 1790, the nation’s first law regulating citizenship, limited naturalization to 
‘free white persons,’ thereby leaving out slaves, free blacks, and indentured servants. In response 
to increased flows of immigrants from Asia, South Central Europe, Mexico, and Latin America 
in the 19th and 20th centuries, some of the strictest ethnic and racial exclusions were written into 
law. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan (1907), Asiatic 
Barred Zone Act (1917), and the National Origins Act (1924) were designed to restrict the flow 
of non-white immigrants to the United States.4  
Marquez and Witte state that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, known as the 
McCarran-Walter Act, abolished previous racial restrictions while retaining national quotas. It 
introduced several new classifications of immigrants, including individuals with special skills, 
individuals with relatives in the United States, and refugees. This Act also provided new powers 
                                               
					3	Benjamin Marquez and John F. Witte, “Immigration Reform: Strategies for Legislative Action,” The Forum 7 
(2009): 1.	
					4	Ibid 
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for the government to deport immigrants and naturalized citizens, and “to prohibit individuals 
deemed to be subversives from entering the country.”5  Moreover, they argue that in the years to 
follow, there were “some legislative successes in passing relatively comprehensive immigration 
reform.”6 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, or the Hart-Celler Act, liberalized the 
nation’s immigration laws by abolishing national origin quotas. On the one hand, the act set annual 
limitations on the number of immigrants. On the other, it established a system of family 
reunification that resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of immigrants from non-European 
countries, especially Asia, Mexico, and Latin America.7  
Furthermore, Marquez and Witte argue that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA), or the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, shifted immigration legislation from legal to illegal 
concerns. According to them, a compromise between restrictionists, business interests, and civil 
rights groups, IRCA greatly expanded funding for border enforcement and created new sanctions 
for hiring the undocumented, while offering amnesty for illegal immigrants already residing in the 
United States.”8 Marquez and Witte maintain that “during the interim between the Hart-Celler bill 
of 1965 and the Simpson-Mazzoli bill of 1986, the issue of illegal immigration exploded in 
America.”9 Moreover, they acknowledge that while there have been efforts to modify limits and 
quotas for legal immigration, they say that it is the treatment of illegals that defines large 
immigration reform packages in 1986.10  They identify amnesty, or the “paths to citizenship” as 
the most explosive of these issues, separating pro-immigration supporters and restrictionists, as 
                                               
				5	Benjamin Marquez and John F. Witte, “Immigration Reform: Strategies for Legislative Action,” The Forum 7 
(2009): 1.	
    6 Ibid 
    7 Ibid 
    8 Ibid, 1-2. 
    9 Ibid, 7. 
   10 Ibid 
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well as partisans.11 Consequently, the United States Congress has been in gridlock for decades 
over how to deal with the unprecedented number of illegal immigrants currently residing within 
its borders; an estimated 11.2 million in 2016 according to a Pew Center survey.12   
Clearly an area of contention for many Americans, it is worth looking into this recurring 
issue to determine why major immigration reform has been possible at some points in modern 
American history, but seems to be politically impossible today. In my research of this topic, I 
have encountered a plethora of scholarly articles related to illegal immigration in the United 
States; many of these focused on finding a solution to the problem of illegal immigration. 
However, scholars such as Sarah Binder, Susan Martin, Jennifer Merolla, Benjamin Marquez, 
and John F. Witte have attempted to explain the reasons why this problem has yet to be 
addressed by US lawmakers. Thus, the aim of this study is to add to this literature by 
emphasizing the underlying reasons a solution to the problem of illegal immigration has been 
politically difficult, while reaffirming some of these scholars’ positions. Furthermore, this 
research will aim to connect the issue to contemporary America, and offer a conclusion about the 
factors affecting Congress’s ability to pass immigration reform today.  
There have been several key moments in immigration reform in the United States since 
the 1960s, starting with major change in immigration policy that took place under President 
Johnson in 1965. This paper will examine two key moments of successful reform in US history; 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act.  In recent times however, Americans have seen the failure of Congress to enact immigration 
                                               
     11 Benjamin Marquez and John F. Witte, “Immigration Reform: Strategies for Legislative Action,” The Forum 7 
(2009): 7. 
     12 Jeffrey S. Passel, and D’Vera Cohn, “Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce Stable After the Great 
Recession,” Pew Research Center (2016).  
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reform, and the use by Presidents Obama and Trump of executive authority in order to bring 
about any sort of changes. Consequently, this paper will also examine one key moment of 
unsuccessful reform effort of the US Congress to enact immigration reform; the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.   
I will argue that increased political polarization in American politics and in Congress, is 
largely responsible for this country’s failure to address comprehensive immigration reform 
today. Using qualitative analysis and the partisan polarization theoretical framework posited by 
Alan I. Abramowitz, this paper will undertake a comparative case study approach to examine the 
underlying factors that appear to have influenced the lack of immigration reform in the United 
States in recent times. Consequently, I will examine the roles of three independent variables – 
partisan polarization, bipartisanship, and public attitudes - to assess the factors seemingly 
responsible for the success, or failure of immigration reform at each of these three key points in 
time.  
I will posit that US lawmakers today are unable to address immigration reform because 
they are too ideologically divided to agree on the best solution to the issue of dealing with illegal 
immigration. Moreover, I will argue that this ideological polarization is reflective of the partisan 
polarization of the electorate. As a result, my research will seek to determine the role partisan 
polarization played in addressing immigration reform in 1965, 1986, and 2013. Did Congress 
become more polarized over these years? Similarly, I will examine the role of bipartisanship at 
these points in time. Did it become increasingly difficult to compromise over these years? 
Finally, I will assess the impact of public opinion/attitudes at these key moments. Is there 
evidence that the public became more divided on the issue over time? 
	 7	
The research paper will proceed in five sections. Chapter I will provide a review of the 
existing literature on the issue of illegal immigration, and examine the explanations offered for 
the lack of reform in this area. Chapter II will be a case study of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965, to examine the roles played by the independent variables at this point in time. 
Similarly, Chapter III will be a case study of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act to 
also examine the factors that seem to be responsible for successful immigration reform during 
that period. Chapter IV will be a case study of the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 to determine what factors appeared to contribute to the 
failure of this effort. Finally, Chapter V will offer a conclusion about the factors affecting 
Congress’s ability to pass immigration reform in the United States today. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Polarization in Congress: 
According to Alan I. Abramowitz, the main cause of dysfunctional government in 
Washington today is partisan polarization, which he defines as the deep ideological divide that 
exists between Democrats and Republicans. Moreover, he argues that this ideological divide 
reflects the existence of deep divisions within American society.13  Abramowitz argues that in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the ideological divide between the parties has 
widened dramatically: The Democratic Party has moved steadily to the left since the 1960s while 
the Republican Party has moved steadily to the right. He maintains that conservative Democrats 
and liberal Republicans, who exercised considerable influence in Congress from the end of 
                                               
     13 Alan I. Abramowitz, “The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December, 2013): 710. 
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World War II through the 1960s, have almost completely disappeared.14  
Furthermore, Abramowitz contends that in the past 36 years, there has been a substantial 
increase in the distance between the parties in both chambers and especially in the House of 
Representatives: the distance between the average Democrat and the average Republican almost 
doubled between the Ninety-Fifth House (1977-79) and the 112th House (2011-13), while the 
distance between the average Democrat and the average Republican increased by almost 50% 
between the Ninety-Fifth Senate and the 112th Senate. However, he argues that both parties were 
not equally responsible for this increase in ideological polarization: the rightward shift of the 
Republican Party over these years was much greater than the leftward shift of the Democratic 
Party. In fact, Abramowitz states that over 80% of the increase in the size of the ideological 
divide in the House, and over 70% of the increase in the Senate was a result of the rightward 
shift in the location of the average Republican.15  
Moreover, Abramowitz says that the growing ideological divide between the parties in 
the House and Senate has had profound consequences for the congressional decision-making 
process. According to him, these consequences have been especially significant during periods of 
divided party control of Congress. For instance, he argues that in the Ninety-Seventh Congress, 
following the 1980 presidential election, Republicans held a majority of seats in the Senate, 
while Democrats held a majority of seats in the House. In the 112th Congress, following the 
2010 midterm election, Republicans held a majority of seats in the House while Democrats held 
a majority of seats in the Senate. Abramowitz contends that despite the superficial similarity 
                                               
     14 Alan I. Abramowitz, “US Senate Elections in a Polarized Era,” The US Senate: From Deliberation to 
Dysfunction (Washington: CQ Press, 2012): 2. 
    15 Alan I. Abramowitz, “The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December, 2013): 710-712.   
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between these two congresses, the deep ideological divide between the parties in the 112th 
House and Senate made any sort of bipartisan compromise much more difficult than in the 
Ninety-Seventh Congress.16 
In addition, Abramowitz argues that the dramatic decline in the number of moderates and 
the growing ideological divide between the parties in both the House and Senate has made 
bipartisan compromise much more difficult in both chambers. According to him, it was much 
easier for Democrats and Republicans to come together 30 years ago when the ideological 
distance between them was much smaller. Today, he says that reaching across the aisle requires 
reaching much further than in 1981-83. Abramowitz argues that this does not matter very much 
in the House of Representatives where the majority party can easily pass legislation without any 
help from the minority party as long as it remains unified. However, he states that it matters a 
great deal in the Senate because it makes filibustering – efforts to hold the Senate floor in order 
to prevent a vote on a bill - much more attractive to members of the minority party.  Abramowitz 
contends that not only is the ideological distance between the median Democrat and the median 
Republican much greater now, but it is much more difficult now for the majority party to obtain 
60 votes to invoke cloture – legislative vote used to stop debate on an issue and put it to a vote - 
because the ideological distance between the majority pivot and the filibuster pivot is much 
greater today than it was in the Ninety-Seventh Senate.17 
 
                                               
				16Alan I. Abramowitz, “The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December, 2013): 710-712. 
    17 Ibid, 712-713.   
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Polarization in The Electorate: 
Abramowitz also contends that the fundamental cause of gridlock in the United States 
Congress is the fact that Democrats and Republicans disagree sharply on almost every major 
issue the country faces, including taxes, spending, gay rights and abortion. In addition, he argues 
that “there has been an increase in the consistency of positions on economic and cultural issues 
over time so that those who are liberal on economic issues are increasingly likely to be liberal on 
cultural issues, while those who are conservative on economic issues are increasingly likely to be 
conservative on cultural issues.”18  Abramowitz believes that this creates a situation where those 
on opposing sides on one issue are increasingly likely to be on opposing sides on other issues.  
He argues that the attitude that “today’s ally may be tomorrow’s opponent while today’s 
opponent may be tomorrow’s ally”19 is much less prevalent than in the past.  He believes that this 
ability to make an ally today of yesterday’s opponent, “tends to dampen the intensity of political 
conflict.” 20  He maintains that Democrats and Republicans however, now find themselves on 
opposing sides on almost all issues. 
Abramowitz also believes there is a close connection between the growing ideological 
divide between Democrats and Republicans in Washington, and the growing divisions within 
American society.  He states that trends examined in election results as well as survey data on the 
changing characteristics and attitudes of voters, show that over the past four decades the parties 
in the electorate have become increasingly divided along geographic, racial, cultural, and 
ideological lines.21  
                                               
    18 Alan I. Abramowitz, “The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December, 2013): 713-714. 
   19 Ibid, 714. 
   20 Ibid, 712-714.  
   21 Ibid, 714. 	
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According to Abramowitz, today most Democratic elected officials represent strongly 
Democratic constituencies and receive a large share of their votes from African Americans, 
Latinos, and other nonwhites.  He argues that Democratic voters in these constituencies tend to 
hold liberal views on the size and role of government as well as on social issues such as abortion 
and gay rights. Abramowitz argues that the more attentive, informed and active these Democratic 
voters are, the more likely they are to hold liberal views on these issues. On the other hand, he 
maintains that most Republican elected officials represent strongly Republican constituencies 
and receive only a tiny share of their votes from African Americans, Latinos, and other 
nonwhites. In his view, Republican voters in these constituencies tend to hold conservative views 
on the size and role of government as well as on social issues.  As with the case of Democratic 
votes, Abramowitz argues that the more attentive, informed, and active these Republican voters 
are, the more likely they are to hold conservative views on these issues. He reasons that the large 
ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans in Washington reflect the large 
differences between the characteristics and attitudes of the voters represented by the two 
parties.22 
The concept of partisan polarization is crucial to this study because it explains the current 
state of the United States’ political system and begs the question of whether or not this was the 
state of affairs in 1965, 1986 and 2013.  If polarization is found to be a factor affecting decision 
making both in Congress and among the electorate in 2013, it becomes clear why it remains 
challenging today to address the issue of illegal immigrants, and consequently immigration 
reform. This polarization, characterized by stalemate and ideological divergence, will explain 
why it has been difficult for Republicans and Democrats in Congress to compromise when 
                                               
22	Alan I. Abramowitz, “The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December, 2013): 714.	
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deciding on what actions need to be taken to address the issue of illegal immigration in the 
United States. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 Using qualitative analysis and a comparative case study approach, I will examine the 
context of the legislative processes used in enacting three pieces of legislation - the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, and the Border 
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 – in order to find 
the answer to my research question. I will rely on both primary and secondary data such as 
books, journal articles, government websites, opinion polls, congressional voting records, public 
records, and dissertations to test my hypothesis and elicit conclusions. 
While the US Congress has made many attempts at immigration reform between 1965 
and 2018, I chose to focus on these specific Acts for several reasons. The 1965 Act was chosen 
for examination because it can be described as legislation that changed the future of immigration 
in the United States. The 1986 Act was chosen because it was through this legislation that 
millions of illegal immigrants in the United States were granted amnesty as a means of reforming 
a ‘broken immigration system;’ a very contentious issue in contemporary US politics.  Finally, 
the 2013 Act was chosen because it is the most recent attempt at overhauling the immigration 
system in the US, and in this case - unlike in 1965 and 1986 - Congress was unable to find 
consensus to pass this bill.   
Examination of these crucial moments in American history will allow me to test my 
hypothesis that in recent times the task of immigration reform has been unattainable due to 
	 13	
partisan polarization, not only in the United States Congress, but also among the electorate.  I 
will explore each Act individually addressing three variables in each instance – partisan 
polarization, bipartisanship, and public opinion/attitudes in that era. Partisan polarization will be 
measured by examining congressional voting records for evidence of split party line voting, and 
secondary literature will be examined for evidence of stalemate, and ideological divergence.  
Bipartisanship will be measured by examining congressional voting records for evidence 
of centrist voting; that is evidence of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. 
Additionally, this variable will be measured by the presence of bipartisan groups within 
congress. In the secondary literature, bipartisanship will be measured by instances of 
compromise between the two parties when making decisions on issues, or each party’s 
willingness to work with the other despite differences in views, opinions, ideas, or strategies. 
Finally, public opinion/attitudes will be measured by examining opinion polls for 
evidence of the electorate’s division on the issue by party, and public interest or lack of interest 
in immigration. Furthermore, secondary literature will be examined for information from polls 
and opinion surveys, public reactions to policies and decisions made by lawmakers regarding 
immigration, and the public voicing their opinions on issues, or putting pressure on lawmakers to 
enact change in the direction they want it to go. Similarly, Congress’ success will be measured 
by its ability to compromise, or display evidence of bipartisanship, as well as its ability to 
actually enact legislation despite contention. Conversely, failure will be measured by Congress’ 
inability to compromise, and its inability to actually enact legislation on contentious issues.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Susan F. Martin argues that proponents of comprehensive immigration reform are correct 
in their summation that the US immigration system is badly broken. Martin makes reference to a 
yardstick established by The Commission on Immigration Reform for measuring the credibility 
of immigration policies: "People who should get in, do get in; people who should not get in are 
kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to leave."23 She concluded that 
the large number of unauthorized migrants, in combination with the lengthy backlogs 
in the legal immigration system, demonstrates that US immigration policy fails this simple test.24 
Nearly half (47%) of Americans believe that the number of immigrants coming to the 
country illegally has increased over the last five or six years.25 According to Jones et al, roughly 
one-third (34%) say the rate has stayed about the same, and 13% say it has decreased. They 
argue that views about the relative rate of unauthorized immigration are closely associated with 
political predispositions; for instance, Republicans (63%) are more likely than Democrats (44%) 
or independents (42%) to believe illegal immigration has increased.  Additionally, among 
members of the Tea Party – conservative activists emerging in late 2008, early 2009 - nearly 
two-thirds (66%) believe that the number of immigrants coming to the US illegally has increased 
over the last few years.26 
                                               
    23 Susan F. Martin, “Waiting Games: The Politics of US Immigration Reform,” Current History 108.717 (2009): 
166. 
     24 Ibid 
     25 Estimates of unauthorized migration show a dramatic decline between 2007 and 2009 with this decline stalling 
between 2010 to 2012. The current estimate of 11.7 million immigrants who are in the country illegally remains 
significantly below the 12.2 million estimated to be in the country in 2007. See Passel, Jeffrey S. D’Vera Cohn and 
Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed,” Pew 
Research Center, September 23, 2013. 
     26 Robert P. Jones et al., “What Americans Want from Immigration Reform in 2014,” Findings from the 
PRRI/Brookings Religion, Values and Immigration Reform Survey, Panel Call Back. Public Religion Research 
Institute, 2014: 16.	
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So why have efforts to reform the immigration system not been responsive to this belief 
that illegal immigration continues to rise? I will discuss possible factors that may account for this 
failure to act on the part of US lawmakers such as partisan polarization, the complex nature of the 
issue, the framing of the issue by politicians, activists, and the media, public attitudes toward 
immigration reform, and the current approach to reform.  
 
Partisan Polarization:  
Sarah Binder argues that the debt limit crisis which occurred in the United States in 2011 
is just one example of “the many episodes of legislative deadlock fuelling debate about whether 
Congress has lost its ability to identify and resolve major public problems.”27 According to 
Binder, in October 2011 Congress garnered its lowest approval rating (9%) in polling history.  
She states that public trust in the government’s capacity to solve the major problems facing the 
country also hit record lows; almost all Americans felt their country was on the wrong track and 
were pessimistic about the future.  Binder says that the public viewed both parties negatively, 
and the widespread consensus was that “politics and governance were utterly dysfunctional.”28  
 After four decades of observing the US Congress, Mann and Ornstein concede that “there 
is no denying the impact of broad changes in America’s wider political environment – most 
importantly the ideological polarization of the political parties – on how Congress went about its 
work.”  They state that they have documented the demise of regular order, as Congress bent rules 
to marginalize committees and deny the minority party in the House opportunities to offer 
amendments on the floor. They point to “the decline of genuine deliberation in the lawmaking 
                                               
     27 Sarah Binder, “The Dysfunctional Congress,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 86. 
     28 Ibid, 85-101. 
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processes on such important matters as budgets and decisions to go to war; the manifestations of 
extreme partisanship; the culture of corruption; the loss of institutional patriotism among 
members; and the weakening of the checks-and-balances system.”29  
 According to Mann and Ornstein, the US Congress is dysfunctional because there is a 
serious mismatch between the political parties, which in their view have become “as vehemently 
adversarial as parliamentary parties.” Moreover, they attribute this dysfunction to a governing 
system that makes it extremely difficult for majorities to act. Second, they cite the fact that one 
of the two major parties – the Republican Party – has become “an insurgent outlier.” They 
contend that the Republican Party has become “ideologically extreme, contemptuous of the 
inherited social and economic policy regime, scornful of compromise, unpersuaded by 
conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science, and dismissive of the legitimacy of its 
political opposition.” Mann and Ornstein argue that when one party moves this far from the 
center of American politics, it is extremely difficult to enact policies responsive to the country’s 
most pressing challenges.30  
 Sarah Binder concurs that levels of legislative deadlock have steadily risen over the past 
half century.  She argues that stalemate at times now reaches across three-quarters of the 
germane issues on lawmakers’ agenda.  Binder argues that partisan polarization appears to be on 
“the verge of passing historical levels in the Senate and has surpassed House records stemming 
from the turn of the century.”31  Furthermore, she supports the argument that this polarization is 
asymmetric: Republicans (particularly in the House) have moved farther to the right than 
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Democrats have moved to the left.  According to Binder, “so long as some degree of polarization 
is driven by sheer partisan team play – in which the opposition party is more likely to object to 
proposals endorsed by the president – then extreme levels of partisanship will continue to lead to 
unprecedented levels of deadlock.”32  
Gary C. Jacobson supports these arguments. In fact, he states that there is systematic 
evidence documenting the increasing partisan polarization in Congress, particularly as traced by 
scholars Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal since the 1980s. Jacobson points to two notable 
discoveries by Poole and Rosenthal; first, that congressional parties have moved apart 
ideologically in both the Senate and the House, and second, that Republicans have been 
responsible for most of the change – more than 80% for both chambers.33  According to 
Jacobson, “the congressional parties have been driven apart by a diverse array of interacting 
internal and external forces, but one essential factor has been the corresponding polarization of 
the congressional parties’ respective electoral bases, which was itself in part a reaction to 
polarized national politics.”34   
Similarly, Matthew N. Beckmann argues that because elected officials’ foremost 
consideration is keeping their jobs, “partisan electoral incentives bleed into governance.”  
Beckmann contends that this can discourage presidents and opposing partisans from seeking 
agreement or making concessions “even when bipartisan policy accord is possible.”35  
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Moreover, Beckmann says that with the increased political gridlock in Congress, more attention 
has been focused on whether the public is becoming more polarized, that is, taking more extreme 
stands on issues, which would create a more fractured society.36 
 
The Complex Nature of the Issue: 
 Susan Martin argues that part of the explanation for America’s repeated failure to achieve 
reform is the controversial nature of the immigration issue in US politics. She states that 
this issue sparks intense reactions on both sides of the political spectrum. Different groups are 
equally committed to ensuring, on the one hand, that unauthorized migrants are kept out 
of the country and do not receive amnesty if they have entered illegally; and on the other hand, 
that those who provide needed work gain the fullest access possible to employment 
opportunities, benefits, and citizenship.37  Another reason Martin proposes for the lack of 
immigration reform in the United States is the nature of the political coalitions that form around 
immigration, which makes it difficult to gain consensus. She identifies different groups in the 
debate, all of which are characterized by varying attitudes about immigration levels on the one 
hand, and immigrant rights on the other. These groups may support each other on some issues, 
and oppose each other on other issues, making it difficult to come to a consensus on the overall 
issue. 
Martin also argues that many Americans speak fondly and nostalgically about their own 
immigrant ancestors who, in their minds, created the nation of immigrants. At the same time, she 
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argues, they are fearful that today's immigrants are somehow different and less likely to contribute 
and assimilate - that is, to become true Americans. Martin contends that the result of this ambivalence 
is the absence of any strong consensus among the public about changes in immigration policy. According to 
her, “a small group that knows what it opposes can often preempt action - as witnessed in immigrant rallies 
that derailed House Republican enforcement measures and talk radio shows that derailed Senate 
regularization measures. But pressure for positive changes is too often lacking. The safe decision 
for politicians is no decision - at least until there is no choice but to act.”38 
Former Representative Tom DeLay (R-Texas) also seemed to think immigration reform 
was a complex issue. In a 2010 address to Congress, he accused President Obama of shying away 
from his campaign promise of immigration reform. He felt that the then president did not approach 
the issue as a priority. According to DeLay, “…if left up to Congress alone to drive a message, 
an issue as complex as immigration will fragment into a million shards on the floor.” He argued 
that illegal immigration and the broken immigration system was a serious matter that should be a 
Congressional and Presidential priority.  He acknowledged that this would be difficult but stated 
that “sometimes the things that are the most difficult are the things that most need to be done.” 
DeLay argued that given the complexity and the magnitude of the problem, immigration reform 
needed border security measures much stronger than the current law to secure any chance of 
bipartisan success. 39   
 
 
 
                                               
     38 Susan F. Martin, “Waiting Games: The Politics of US Immigration Reform,” Current History 108.717 (2009): 
164. 
				39 Tom DeLay. The Left is Right: On Immigration Reform Delay. Roll Call; Washington DC (Washington, DC) 
16 Mar 2010. 
	 20	
Framing of The Issue: 
The manner in which the issue of illegal immigration has been framed in the United 
States is undoubtedly a factor in Congress’ challenges in reforming the immigration system. 
According to Cook, nativists – those favouring the interests of Americans over those of 
immigrants - have framed the debate in the US through a combination of website appeals by 
lobby groups (Numbers USA), popular radio talk shows (Rush Limbaugh), and television 
“news” (Lou Dobbs on CNN; Fox News).  Cook argues that nativists’ domination of local media 
outlets and their ability to organize at the grassroots have shifted the national debate in an 
increasingly conservative direction. Moreover, she states that Republicans and Democrats who 
initially supported immigration reform have become more cautious or have become 
restrictionists themselves.  Cook also contends that those who were earlier marginalized as 
extreme have moved to the mainstream.  She also reported that even when Democrats talked 
about the legalization of 12 million undocumented immigrants, they were careful to avoid the 
term “amnesty,” stressed the need to “get in line,” and affirmed their strong support for “securing 
our borders” as a first step.40 
Merolla et al argue that even though there are other important aspects of immigration policy 
that should be relevant to Congress - such as the shortage of workers with advanced degrees in 
science and engineering and the need for improvements in temporary agricultural worker programs 
- much of the public's attention has been focused on the problem of illegal immigration. According 
to them, much of the floor debate and related media coverage on immigration matters centered on 
the issue of illegal immigration.  
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Merolla et al maintain that “amidst the policy debates, advocates and elected officials have 
attempted to shape public opinion and legislative outcomes in their favour, with increasing 
attention to the framing of policy in news coverage and popular discourse. In addition to 
disagreeing over policy framing, advocates have also fought over the terms used to describe the 
people themselves who may be affected by such policies. On the liberal side, advocates have 
preferred to use the term "undocumented" instead of "illegal," arguing that the latter tilts the debate 
in favour of restriction. At the same time, conservative advocates on immigration have long 
insisted on using the word "illegal," arguing that alternative terms mask the fundamental legal 
violations committed by those who overstay their visas or enter the country without one. Finally, 
many policy analysts, demographers, and federal government agencies have preferred to use the 
term "unauthorized immigration," opting for a more descriptively accurate, and perhaps politically 
less laden term to refer to those who may be eligible for deportation.” 41  
Merolla et al highlight Lakoff and Ferguson’s argument that the “illegal frame” 
criminalizes and dehumanizes immigrants, especially by referring to them as “aliens,” which 
immediately implies an otherness or an “invasion,” and inflates the severity of the “offense” of 
immigrating illegally. The “security” frame, they add, draws upon the “threat” of immigration, 
especially the threat of terrorism, and stresses the need for “border security.” Furthermore, Lakoff 
and Ferguson argue that the “undocumented worker” and “temporary worker” frames limit the role 
of immigrants to “worker,” and lead to the disregard of civil and human rights of immigrants.42 
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Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform: 
Dunaway et al argue that the public’s attitude toward immigration has traditionally been 
different for those residing in states that share a border with Mexico, and those living in non-border 
states. They suggest that public opinion toward immigration points to several explanations that are 
based on individual-level characteristics such as economic outlook, age, gender, education, 
partisanship, and ideology.  According to Dunaway et al, “news coverage is a potentially important 
and currently neglected explanatory variable in determining Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigration.”43 Experiments they conducted showed that when the media devoted greater 
attention to immigration, the public was more likely to identify immigration as one of the nation’s 
most important problems. Their findings highlighted two features of the public’s perception of 
immigration: first, that public opinion on immigration varies according to the amount of news 
coverage on immigration. Second, they found that “the significant interaction between border state 
residency and media coverage of immigration suggests that when media coverage of immigration 
increases, the gap in the perception of the importance of immigration among individuals residing 
in non-border versus Border States decreases.” 44 
Similarly, Terry-Ann Jones argues that public opinion on immigration policies vary 
extensively based on factors such as political ideology, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
geographic region. Further, she contends that dynamics such as economic crises, widespread 
unemployment, and heightened security concerns periodically produce changes in these opinions. 
Jones also contends that both advocates of, and opponents to immigration, promote their agendas 
through organizations and the news media, and simultaneously represent the public and influence 
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the public. Additionally, Jones argues that public opinion is essential to immigration policies, 
which she says are periodically modified to reflect both domestic and international conditions. 
Furthermore, she maintains that public support for immigration policies inform the way in which 
immigrants are received; for instance, immigrants may encounter hostility in environments where 
the majority of the public holds unfavourable attitudes toward them.45 
Ward Kay argues that on immigration reform, “the motivated minority that highly 
influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of 
Americans.”46 Kay makes reference to a 2006 attempt at comprehensive immigration reform 
whose main tenets were supported by 80% of Americans in a Gallup poll. This reform effort was 
defeated however, when anti-immigration opponents flooded the Senate switchboard with protest 
calls. Kay also carried out a study which found that the majority of Americans’ views are not 
represented by interest groups involved in the policy debate on immigration. According to Kay, 
Americans are moderate in their viewpoint, being both against the flow of unauthorized 
immigration while at the same time acknowledging that hard working immigrants should be 
allowed to become citizens.  Kay says however, that “for those who support stricter immigration 
measures, the issue is of higher salience, which provides them with more influence than the general 
public.”47 
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Approach to Reform: 
Benjamin Marquez and John F. Witte suggest that immigration reform in the United 
States has not been possible because the various complex issues involved in immigration are 
“considered as a comprehensive package of reforms instead of being addressed as separable and 
discrete issues, subject to serial and incremental legislation.”48 They argue that although there is 
widespread admission that some immigration reforms have failed, there remains a political 
proclivity for large reform efforts.  Marquez and Witte believe the reasons may be that “political 
reputations and credit-taking are on the line, and cannot be satisfied by more modest, serial 
attacks on a set of issues.”49 Alternatively, they propose that perhaps only through large packages 
can there be enough agreements with diverse groups to reach a compromise on any of the issues 
of the day.  In other words, “by adding and subtracting issues, coalitions build to a majority – a 
majority not obtainable on most of the discrete issues considered separately.”50  While Marquez 
and Witte concede that their conclusion is not definitive, they suggest that political leaders 
should ask if it is better to solve discrete issues or push for large packages that may be “sub-
optimal on many of the issues included.”51  
Furthermore, Marquez and Witte suggest that the most important stimulus for the passage 
of bills should be a clear majority consensus on how a bill can improve a situation over the status 
quo. They believe that a number of the issues that support restricting illegal immigrants may well 
fall within this domain. According to Marquez and Witte, border security clearly does, and they 
contend that there is relatively strong support for either separate or negotiated combinations on 
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employer sanctions, worker identification, and guest or temporary worker programs. They argue 
however, that “although few advocate mass deportation or unconstrained amnesty for those 
residing illegally in the country, the intensity of these issues may make compromises in the 
absence of overwhelming partisan majorities very difficult. This they state, is why little has been 
done on these issues since the 1980s.”52  
 Similarly, Susan Martin argues that top down reform efforts by Congress have failed in 
large part because they sought to achieve too much too quickly. Instead, she suggests that the US 
Congress needs comprehensive reform “achieved incrementally to ensure the effectiveness and 
test the impact of new approaches.” 53 Martin believes this strategy would have a better chance of 
convincing skeptics on both sides of the debate. On the other hand, John N. Wiegner argues that 
previous immigration reforms failed to reduce illegal immigration by attacking illegal immigrant 
costs. He proposes that new immigration reforms should consider reducing or eliminating illegal 
immigrant benefits, which would have the effect of increasing perceived costs thereby prompting 
self-removal from the country.54  
 A review of the literature on this issue has revealed several possible factors that can be 
responsible for Congress’ inability to address comprehensive reform. I have however, chosen to 
examine three of these variables more closely - partisan polarization, bipartisanship, and public 
opinion/attitudes - to test my hypothesis. These variables have been identified both by Alan I. 
Abramowitz and academic scholars cited in the literature review, as significant contributing factors 
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to the issue of immigration reform. Moreover, I believe these variables have the most potential for 
accurately examining immigration reform in the United States using the cases and methodology I 
have chosen. These variables easily lend themselves to qualitative analysis and comparative case 
studies; primary and secondary data such as books, journal articles, government websites, 
congressional voting records, public records, public opinion polls, and dissertations can be perused 
for examples of polarization, bipartisanship, and public opinion/attitudes for the time periods under 
examination.  
The following chapters will provide comparative case studies of the three reform efforts in 
1965, 1986, and 2013. For each of these case studies, I will examine the role played by these 
variables in determining the success, or failure of the reform effort. The next section, Chapter II, 
will be a case study of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 27	
CHAPTER II 
CASE STUDY:  
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965 
 
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos states that “the 1965 Immigration Act’s origins lie in the 
desire of lawmakers to rid US immigration policy of its reliance on racially discriminatory 
criteria, captured most directly in the infamous National Origins Quota System.”55 According to 
Triadafilopoulos, US Presidents from Harry Truman onward saw the quotas and other 
restrictions to immigration from Asia and elsewhere as impediments to American national 
interests and campaigned vigorously to have them removed. Triadafilopoulos says that they were 
“opposed by supporters of restriction in Congress, who carried the day with the passage of the 
1952 Immigration Act, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act.”56 The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 (the Hart-Celler Act) became law on October 3, 1965.  Eric 
Arnesen argues that the new law may not have been perfect, as some were disappointed “at the 
restrictions imposed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere,” but he says its overall 
impact was positive, as “the new law can be hailed for putting an end to 41 years of 
discrimination in which immigration quotas were based on nationality…”57 
As signed by Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson, the major provisions of the bill 
provided for the following: first, the national-origins quota system would be abolished as of July 
1, 1968. Until that time, unused visas would go into a pool and be made available to countries 
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with backlogs on preference waiting lists. Second, the Asia-Pacific Triangle pro-vision was 
repealed immediately. Third, a limitation of 170,000 immigrant visas, exclusive of parents, 
spouses and children of United States citizens, was established on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Fourth, a ceiling of 20,000 visas annually was imposed for any one such country. Fifth, for 
natives of independent Western Hemisphere countries, an overall ceiling of 120,000 visas, 
exclusive of parents, spouses and children of United States citizens, was established, effective 
July 1, 1968, unless Congress provided otherwise. Finally, seven preference categories were 
established; four for the purpose of family reunion, two for professional and skilled or unskilled 
workers, and one preference for refugees, including those displaced by natural calamity.58 
Maddalena Marinari argues that while many Americans today blame the 1965 
Immigration Act for what they see as the end of restriction and the country’s loss of control over 
its borders, migration and policy scholars in her view, have demonstrated that the law was hardly 
“a paragon of liberal immigration reform.” Marinari says that while these scholars concur that 
the law successfully abolished the national origins quota system and the discriminatory Asia-
Pacific Triangle - immigration reformers’ primary goal - they also note that it created new 
restrictions with its imposition of the first global ceiling on immigration to the United States; the 
first cap on immigrants from the Americas paved the way for today’s dominant immigration 
issue: ever-rising rates of unauthorized entry and illegal residence.”59 
Partisan polarization on the issue of immigration has been a part of the US history for 
decades, beginning with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  In fact, one can argue 
that polarization is partly responsible for the current issues with illegal immigration in the United 
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States; polarization in the 89th Congress led to the restriction of immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere, which scholars like Marinari suggests, created an incentive for immigrants from 
this region to remain in the United States illegally. 
Partisan Polarization: 
According to Triadafilopoulos, by the 1960s, sentiment in Congress regarding the 
National Origins Quota System was shifting; this and other restrictions to immigration from Asia 
and elsewhere were now being viewed as impediments to American national interests. He argues 
that liberal Democrats representing urban constituencies with strong ethnic attachments came out 
in support of reform and were joined by President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy introduced a bill in 
1963 which would have abolished the quota system and replaced racial and ethnic categories 
with admissions criteria based on potential immigrants’ education and work-related skills. The 
proposal also rejected any limits to immigration from the Western Hemisphere and made special 
allowances for the reception of refugees.  Triadafilopoulos argues that the Kennedy bill received 
the support of liberal Democrats in both Houses of Congress, and a broad range of civil society 
groups. Despite this however, “powerful members of congressional committees with 
restrictionist leanings used their influence to block the bill’s progress, effectively bottling it up 
through 1963 and 1964.”60 Progress on immigration reform only resumed after Lyndon Johnson 
assumed the presidency following Kennedy’s assassination.  
This resistance to Kennedy’s bill demonstrates that, like today, partisan polarization 
existed in Congress; not only was it present, but it was seemingly strong enough to repress a bill 
that was popular in both Houses of Congress. It can also be inferred that Triadafilopoulos’ 
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reference to committee members with “restrictionist leanings” who blocked the bill’s progress, 
were Republicans in Congress during this period.  
Triadafilopoulos also argues that despite growing support for changes along the lines set 
out in the Hart-Celler bill, President Johnson was forced to engage in “horse trading” to solidify 
a legislative majority. Specifically, Johnson agreed to demands made by the chair of the House 
Immigration Subcommittee, Michael Feighan (D-OH), to replace the original bill’s preference 
for immigrants with special skills and training with a preference for family members. While 
Feighan’s position was based on pressure by union leaders fearful of increased competition from 
an influx of skilled foreign workers, similar demands from conservatives such as Senator Evrett 
Dirksen (R-IL) were based on using family reunification to limit flows from “non-traditional” 
sources. According to this line of thought, limiting new admissions to the relatives of past 
immigrants would preserve the United States’ distinctively White-European character.  
Again, the polarization in the 1965 Congress seemed to be initiated by the conservatives 
whose ideologies favoured the status quo. Further, in this instance, the literature revealed that 
conservatives in the 1965 Congress were reacting to the pressure being put on them from their 
electorate, which suggests the possibility of a polarized American public as well. According to 
Triadafilopoulos, wary of squandering the Democratic majority in Congress, Johnson opted to 
forgo a long fight with Feighan, Dirksen and other restrictionists and accepted their demands, 
agreeing to replace the original bill’s skills-based preferences with a system that favoured family 
reunification. As a result, 74% of yearly visa allotments were dedicated to family reunification, 
while only 20% were reserved for immigrants with occupational skills. The remaining 6% of 
yearly visas were reserved for refugees.61 It should be noted that the 89th Congress (1965-1967) 
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comprised of 435 Representatives: 295 Democrats and 140 Republicans. Both the Senate and 
House of Representatives were democratically controlled. Johnson’s unwillingness to face off 
with conservatives suggests that partisan polarization was such an issue then, that it was more 
productive to simply give in to restrictionist demands than risk the possibility of ending up with a 
‘dead bill;’ as is the case with the 2013 “Gang of Eight” legislation, which will be examined 
later. 
 Daniel Tichenor agrees with Triadafilopoulos’ view.  Tichenor points out that given the 
bitter conflicts that regularly emerge in the United States over unauthorized immigration, an 
obvious question should be how national policymakers ever translate rival interests and goals 
into sweeping immigration reform. He argues that at the heart of these “rare shifts from gridlock 
to non-incremental policy change lies several recurring elements: the centrality of bipartisan, 
“strange bedfellow” alliances; the necessity of painful compromises to appease disparate actors; 
and the predictable contradictions of resulting immigration reform packages.”62  
According to Tichenor, significant immigration reform in US history has almost always 
demanded the formation of unstable left-right majority coalitions as well as bargains that 
typically encompass competing goals. In his view, it should hardly come as a surprise that rival 
and incongruous elements were woven into the Immigration and Nationality Act. He concurs that 
ironically, House Democrat from Ohio, led a coalition of restriction minded Southern Democrats 
and conservative Republicans who demanded important concessions for ending the national-
origins quota system. Tichenor describes Feighan as an ardent anti-Communist with strong ties 
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to patriotic and nativist organizations, who chaired the House immigration subcommittee and 
regularly clashed with more progressive members of his party.63 
 Katsuyuki Murata agrees that this numerical restriction placed on the Western 
Hemisphere was added to persuade legislators to vote for the bill. These legislators were worried 
about rapid population expansion in Latin American countries and the adverse effects of 
increased immigration, especially on the job market.64  Irving Bernstein, Roger Daniels, and 
Daniel Tichenor argue that President Johnson understood that the window of opportunity for 
liberal legislation was fleeting and skillfully took advantage of the convergence of a Democratic 
landslide election with what Daniels terms “a national consensus of egalitarianism” to pass a 
flawed, but nonetheless momentous immigration law.  Dissenting from this interpretation, Mae 
Ngai and Aristide Zolberg contend that the ease with which reformers accepted the ceiling on 
immigration from the Western Hemisphere reflected their long-standing ambivalence about 
immigrants from the Third World. According to this view, East Coast reformers, disconnected 
from and unfamiliar with the Asian, Mexican, and Latin American communities in the United 
States, willingly acquiesced to an immigration law that continued a regime of restriction to 
protect the status of their own ethnic communities in American society.  
Finally, Otis Graham argues that in their eagerness to repeal the national origins quota 
system, immigration reformers intentionally ignored information available to them about 
changing global demographic trends and pushed for an immigration law that, in his opinion, 
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“moved the country away from a stable population growth to a pattern of intense population 
growth that has had far-reaching and overwhelmingly negative consequences for the country.”65 
Clearly, partisan polarization is not a new phenomenon in the immigration debate. Whatever the 
motivations of the various interests involved, they were powerful forces to be reckoned with. 
This resulted in decisions being made that were not necessarily in the best interests of America, 
as Tichenor and Graham purport. 
          Furthermore, examination of congressional voting records on immigration in 1965 reveals 
evidence of polarization in the 89th Congress.  The 1965 vote to amend HR 2580 - a bill to 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, by establishing on July 1, 1968, a limit of 115,000 
immigrants per year from countries in the Western Hemisphere – resulted in a vote of 228-198.66 
The majority of Democrats (214) were opposed to this bill, while the majority of Republicans 
(121) supported it. These figures support the argument that Congress was polarized on the issue 
in 1965. The following table shows a breakdown of these votes: 
Table 2 shows results of the first vote to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act in 
1965 
 All votes Democrats Republicans 
Yea 198 77 121 
Nay 228 214 14 
Not voting 7 3 4 
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Bipartisanship: 
The second vote to pass HR 2580 - The Amended Immigration and Nationality Act –
revealed an interesting change in the vote: Democrats completely flipped from a majority 
opposing this bill, to a majority supporting it (215). These figures support the literature as 
Tichenor explained the irony of House Democrat from Ohio, Michael Feighan, being the one 
who led a coalition of restriction minded Southern Democrats and conservative to demand that 
the ceiling be imposed on the Western Hemisphere.  This second vote reveals the presence and 
influence of moderates in the 89th Congress. This coalition was able to convince a large majority 
of Democrats to vote in favour of this bill after they had all opposed it in the first vote, resulting 
in the bill’s success by a vote of 325 to 101.  
While this second vote does illustrate the ability of this congress to compromise, it more 
accurately depicts the ability of moderates to significantly affect legislation. The presence of 
moderates in this Congress is also supported by the literature; Tichenor makes reference to both 
restriction minded Southern Democrats, and progressive Conservatives in the 1965 Congress.  
The results of this vote also support Abramowitz’s theory that moderates were more prevalent in 
Congresses prior to 1980, and that compromises are more easily achieved with these individuals 
in Congress. 
Table 3 shows results of the second vote to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act in 
1965 
 All votes Democrats Republicans 
Yea 325 215 110 
Nay 101 76 14 
Not voting 7 3 4 
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 According to Edward M. Kennedy, the long record of defeats for earlier proposals on 
immigration reform inevitably prompts the question as to why Congress acted in 1965. In his 
view, there is little doubt that of key importance was the unusual parliamentary situation in 
Congress, where the large Democratic majority “was generally responsive to the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the administration’s proposal.”67 Kennedy believes that Republican leaders were also 
ready to act on the issue. Moreover, in the Judiciary Committees of both Houses, the balance of 
power lay with those who had long worked for reform, or who readily recognized the need for 
changes in policy governing the admission of immigrants. And in the Executive branch, for the 
first time in more than a decade, the White House, under both President Kennedy and President 
Johnson, was deeply committed to basic reform and actively mobilized its forces to see it 
through.68 
Kennedy maintains that “the legislative history of the bill, especially the drawing of a 
consensus which, in effect, neutralized any significant opposition both within and without the 
Congress, generated an atmosphere receptive to reform which was consonant with changing 
attitudes among citizens on questions of race and national origin.”69 Additionally, he says there 
was a tremendous effort put forth by several private organizations, whose many years of work 
throughout the country were helping to bring the hope of reform into reality.70  
Marinari also argues that “exploiting the administration’s eagerness to abolish the 
national origins quota system and carry out reform swiftly, a group of Southern Democrats, who 
realized reform was inevitable, leveraged its votes and committee positions to obtain crucial 
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concessions from Johnson, the most important of which was the unprecedented imposition of a 
ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere.” 71  
 
Public Opinion/Attitudes: 
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research revealed that at the time of the 1965 
Immigration Act, a majority of Americans (36%) believed immigrants should be admitted into 
the US based on their skills rather than on the basis of their country of origin. 29% indicated that 
immigration should be based on country of origin, 15% indicated that it made no difference to 
them, and 20% of Americans indicated that they were not sure.  Additionally, this research 
reported that 71% of Americans believed that a person’s occupational skills should be a very 
important factor in determining whether or not he/she should be admitted to live in the United 
States, 21% indicated that occupational skills were not very important, and 8% had no opinion. 
This study also revealed that 32% of Americans believed the country in which a person was born 
was a very important factor in determining whether or not he/she should be admitted to the 
United States, 56% indicated that this factor was not very important, while 11% had no 
opinion.72  
In addition, Gallup polls that year found less than 1% of the public naming immigration 
as the most important problem facing the nation. And, by the end of 1965, the Harris poll found 
just 3% naming immigration revision as the legislation most important to them (Back then, 
Medicare legislation was cited most often – 28%). While Americans were much quieter about 
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immigration back then, the public was divided about the right level of immigration. A June 1965 
Gallup poll found that 39% preferred maintaining present levels, almost as many said they 
should be decreased (33%), and only a few (7%) favoured increased immigration.73  
In the end, a majority of the public approved of changing the laws so that people would 
be admitted on the basis of their occupational skills rather than their country of origin. And after 
the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed fully, 70% said they favoured the new law. 
According to Andrew Kohut, an approval score like that was possible because, unlike today, 
there were almost no partisan differences on the issue.  A 1964 survey administered by the 
American National Election Studies revealed that 9% of Americans saw themselves as 
independent, 15% felt they were leaning independent, 38% said they felt weak partisanship, and 
38% said they felt strong partisanship.74 In addition, a mid-1965 Gallup poll found 54% of 
Republicans and 49% of Democrats favouring the concept of admittance based on job skills. 
Support was only modestly lower among two population groups: less well-educated Americans 
(44%) and Southerners (40%).75   
Moreover, as Acting Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Edward M. Kennedy conducted extensive hearings on the immigration bill, open 
to any individual or organization which requested to be heard.  According to Kennedy, fifty-six 
witnesses presented their views and responded to comprehensive questioning by members of the 
Subcommittee. Kennedy argues that every conceivable opinion was heard, but the witnesses 
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overwhelmingly supported the basic principles contained in the Administration's bill. Moreover, 
a number of organizations which had traditionally opposed changes in the national origins 
concept, “softened their opposition considerably in view of the obvious unworkability of the 
quota system and the growing public pressure for reform.”76 The Immigration and Nationality 
Act was passed in 1965, at the height of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Ruth 
Gomberg-Muñoz argues that the passage of the Hart-Celler Act was “celebrated as the dawn of a 
new era in US immigration policy - one that moved away from the explicitly race-based 
immigration policies of the past. Although this Act was immigration legislation, it was widely 
considered to be an extension of civil rights legislation.”77 
Chapter Summary: 
The 1965 case study reveals elements of all three variables under investigation; partisan 
polarization, bipartisanship/compromise, and the influence of public opinion. The literature 
shows that despite a Democratic majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives, 
conservatives in the House were able to block the bill for two years and demanded concessions 
in exchange for voting to end the National Origins Quota System. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act passed only after these restrictionists were pacified with the ceiling imposed on 
the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, congressional voting records during this period illustrated 
the polarization between these two parties on the issue of immigration.  It is interesting to note 
however, that opposition to this bill was ironically led by a group of Southern Democrats, whose 
ideology aligned with that of conservatives on this issue. 
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Bipartisanship in this Congress also involved this group of Southern Democrats and 
conservative Republicans. The literature revealed that Republicans were under pressure from 
their electorate to protect their interests, while Democrats were under pressure from their 
electorate to change a system they viewed as discriminatory. Both parties therefore had their 
motivations for working together. It can be argued that President Johnson gave in to these 
concessions in order to prevent a long battle with restrictionists, and to quickly enact the desired 
changes. This group, according to Marinari, exploited the administration’s eagerness for reform, 
and leveraged its votes and committee positions to obtain concessions from President Johnson. 
Tichenor also referenced this group of moderates in the literature; the restriction-minded 
Southern Democrats – that is conservative Democrats - whose presence was crucial to the 
passage of the bill. It can be argued therefore, that the presence of these moderates made 
compromise easier during this period; particularly since these moderates belonged to the 
majority Democratic party.  
Elements of racial undertones in 1965 were also revealed in the literature which suggests 
that conservatives wanted to limit flows of immigrants from “non-traditional” sources with their 
demand for the ceiling on the Western Hemisphere in order to preserve the White European 
character of the United States and protect the status of their own ethnic communities. This 
suggestion of racially motivated behaviour bears similarity to the 2013 case, which will be 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
The literature also reveals public opinion/attitudes to be a significant contributing factor 
to the passing of legislation in 1965. Congress’s view of the National Origins Quota System was 
consonant with that of the American public, which felt that it was discriminatory, and that 
individuals should not be refused admission to the United States on the grounds of origin. There 
	 40	
was also tremendous pressure for reform from the public at this time due to the political climate, 
which was fraught with civil rights activism. It is important to note that although the public 
generally seemed disinterested in the issue of immigration in 1965, they were unified in their 
strong dissatisfaction with the quota system; a discriminatory practice their opposition helped to 
change.  Moreover, polls showed that the majority of Americans supported the new law once it 
was passed. It can be argued therefore, that public opinion had a significant effect on lawmaking 
during this period, as the Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted in part, in reaction to 
public sentiment. However, it should also be noted that even then, the public was divided about 
the right level of immigration as indicated by the June 1965 Gallup poll; 39% preferred 
maintaining present levels, 33% preferred decreasing levels, and 7% favoured increased 
immigration. This suggests elements of polarization among the American people.  
The next section, Chapter III, will examine the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act to determine the role of the variables with regard to that legislation. 
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                                                            CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY: 
THE 1986 IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 
 
Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz argues that since the Hart-Celler Act, race has all but disappeared 
from immigration policy discussions, while the category of “illegal immigrant” has become ever 
more conspicuous.78  In 1986, the US Congress passed legislation aimed at curbing 
undocumented migration to the United States.  The 99th Congress (1985-1987) consisted of 254 
Democrats and 181 Republicans, under Republican President, Ronald Reagan. Republicans 
retained the White House and Senate, while Democrats maintained a House majority, despite 
Republican gains in the 1984 election.  
According to Donato et al., the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), sought to 
reduce illegal migration through sanctions of employers, increased border enforcement, and a 
legalization program for undocumented migrants already in the United States. The main purpose 
of IRCA was to stop the movement of undocumented migrants to the United States, and it relied 
on several mechanisms to accomplish this. Donato et al state that IRCA prohibited employers 
from hiring undocumented workers and enacted civil and criminal penalties against those who 
did so knowingly. Additionally, they argue that it authorized an increase in the resources 
allocated to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for border enforcement. IRCA, 
according to Donato et al, also provided for the legalization of two types of undocumented 
immigrants already in the United States: those who had resided continuously in the United States 
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since 1982, and those who had worked as agricultural labourers for at least 90 days during 
1986.79   
 This legislation according to Durand and Massey, “not only sought to deter Mexicans 
from leaving and crossing the border, it also attempted to neutralize the magnet of US jobs by 
criminalizing the hiring of undocumented workers.”80 They argue that IRCA for the first time 
required prospective employees to present documents confirming identity and a right to work in 
the US. Employers had to fill out an ‘‘I-9 Form’’ that identified the prospective worker and listed 
the documents he or she had presented. IRCA sought to apply sanctions against employers who 
knowingly hired undocumented migrants, and the I-9 forms were devised as a means to define 
‘‘knowingly.’’ Durand and Massey argue that as long as an employer inspected some reasonable-
looking documents and completed an I-9 form, he or she had satisfied his or her duties under the 
law.81 
 
Partisan Polarization:  
According to Benjamin Gonzalez, while the IRCA bill “sailed through the Senate,” 
largely due to the majority held by Republicans, it failed in the Democratically-controlled House. 
He argues that amendment after amendment was offered and there was resistance to the bill on 
the part of a coalition of business interests and civil rights organizations; the latter concerned 
with the potential discrimination as a result of employer sanctions, and the elimination of the 
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fifth preference category for visas to brothers and sisters of citizens. Moreover, Gonzalez says 
that much of the debate on IRCA in the Senate “focused on the nuts and bolts of 
implementation,” as well as an acknowledgement that this bill was the result of compromise, and 
thus while not an ideal piece of legislation for most, it seemed like the only possibility 
considering the divided nature of Congress, public opinion on undocumented immigration, and 
the need for action. Gonzalez references a House debate, in which Rep. Edward Roybal of 
California pointed out that, “Many have said that they would vote for the bill, but with mixed 
emotions. Others said that they would hold their nose to vote for this piece of legislation. Others 
just would vote for the bill simply because there was nothing else.”82   
Gonzalez argues that the bill, while not popular with everyone, was seen as a necessity, 
because immigration reform was seen as a necessity.83  He contends also that debate in the 
House, where Democrats held a 253-182 majority, was much more contentious than it was in the 
Senate, where most of it focused on fine tuning the bill via amendments and questions about its 
implementation. Gonzalez also argues that overall, there were approximately 48 pages of the 
Congressional Record dedicated to the House debate on IRCA.  Furthermore, he says that some 
of the resistance to IRCA in the House was driven by a perception that the amnesty program 
rewarded criminal behaviour with legalization.  
Gonzalez references a speech by Rep. Barton of Texas, who argued that, “...if we 
condone amnesty, we are condoning an illegal act of those illegal immigrants who have entered 
this country illegally.”84 Similarly, Republican Bill McCollum of Florida, echoed this sentiment 
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by pointing out that, “We are going to be rewarding lawbreakers; people who have been here 
illegally who have no business becoming citizens and permanent residents...”85 This perception 
that undocumented immigrants were being rewarded through amnesty was extensively debated 
to highlight the fact that legal immigrants still had to go through a long process to achieve what 
undocumented immigrants, according to Republicans, “were getting by simply crossing the 
border and avoiding deportation.”86  
The literature reveals that in 1986, partisan polarization was a significant factor in 
decision making regarding immigration in the House of Representatives. Gonzalez states that the 
bill ‘sailed through the Senate,’ which suggests that polarization may not have been a significant 
factor in the Senate. It does suggest however, that like the Congress of 1965, there were 
moderates in the 99th Congress. The literature clearly suggests that members of the House of 
Representatives in the 1986 Congress were very much divided on the issue of immigration; the 
contention mainly stemming from Republicans’ opposition to amnesty. The literature also 
reveals however, that this Congress faced pressure from the electorate to act, and it seems that 
the resulting compromise, IRCA, was felt to be preferable to no response. Additionally, it is clear 
from the literature that many voted for this bill reluctantly. Furthermore, examination of 
congressional voting records on immigration in 1986, like the 1965 case, also reveals some 
polarization. The 1986 vote to pass HR 3810, a bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality 
Act to revise and reform the immigration laws, revealed that the majority of Democrats (172) 
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were in favour of this bill, while the majority of Republicans (106) were opposed.87  This is 
illustrated in the table below: 
Table 3 shows results of the first vote to pass a bill to amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in 1986 
 All votes Democrats Republicans 
Yea 235 172 63 
Nay 171 65 106 
Not voting 27 15 12 
In the second vote on this issue to accept the conference report on S1200, a bill to amend 
the Immigration and Nationality Act to effectively control unauthorized immigration to the 
United States clearing the measure for Senate action, the data revealed similar results to the first 
vote. A clear majority within the Democratic party voted in favour of this action (163), while a 
majority of Republicans (93) were opposed. However, this second vote revealed something that 
was not present in the first vote, or in the 1965 Congress: evidence of polarization within the 
Republican party, suggesting an ideological shift/division within the group. While the majority 
of Democrats were clearly in favour of this bill (163-82), there was clear polarization in the 
Republican vote (79-93), which is a significant difference from the first vote, in which a clear 
majority were opposed to the bill.88 Although it can be argued that these numbers suggest 
dissatisfaction with the amended bill on the part of most Republicans, as a corresponding 
decrease in support from Democrats may support this, the small margin between those 
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Republicans in favour of the bill and those opposed to it in the second vote, seems to more likely 
suggest some polarization and division within the party.  This is illustrated in the table below: 
Table 4 shows results of the vote to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1986 
 All votes Democrats Republicans 
Yea 242 163 79 
Nay 175 82 93 
Not voting 16 7 9 
 
Bipartisanship: 
The third vote on this issue was to adopt the conference report on S1200, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, which would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, to 
effectively control unauthorized immigration into the United States by granting amnesty to 
illegal aliens who can prove that they entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, 
penalizing employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, and establishing a special farm worker 
program for western agricultural growers.  These voting records revealed evidence of 
bipartisanship/compromise; the bill passed with a vote of 67-27, with a majority of Democrats 
(36), and a majority of Republicans (31) voting in favour of this bill. This data also hints at the 
existence of moderates in the 1986 Congress. As we will see in the discussion of the 2013 case, 
the issue of amnesty was a major factor in the death of the proposed bipartisan bill in the 113th 
Congress, which is in direct contrast to this 1986 situation which shows that despite a Republican 
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Senate majority, amnesty was still granted to “nearly 2.7 million individuals.”89 As with the 1965 
case, this too suggests the presence of moderates in the 1986 Congress. 
According to Juan P. Osuna, IRCA was a response to the growing problem of illegal 
immigration in the United States. He states that in 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) reported that apprehensions of undocumented aliens reached an all-time record, 
suggesting that the number of undocumented aliens residing in the country was larger than ever 
before. Osuna argues that when Congress first recognized the growing number of undocumented 
aliens as a significant national concern in the early 1970s, by then, actual immigration in the 
United States had exceeded three times its legal limit. He maintains that in October 1974, the 
United States Attorney General estimated that between four and seven million undocumented 
aliens lived in the United States, while other reports estimated even higher numbers. A 1981 
report estimated that between 7.9 million and 9.9 million undocumented aliens were in the 
United States. By 1986, the most widely accepted figures indicated that between four and six 
million aliens were living in the country.90   
According to Osuna, although immigration has always been an issue in the United States’ 
political history, amnesty has not. He argues that from 1975 to 1986, however, Congress 
considered various amnesty proposals designed to regulate the problem of illegal immigration. 
Osuna states that several alternative solutions were available to control illegal immigration. 
Congress, however, chose a generous amnesty program to legalize the status of millions of 
aliens; this was viewed as the least costly alternative, politically as well as financially and 
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administratively.91  
Public Opinion/Attitudes: 
According to an NBC and 1982 Roper investigation, two thirds of Americans called for 
the government to take serious measures to control illegal immigrants. They were afraid that 
illegal immigrants were seizing jobs and sharing public benefits. According to a 1983 Gallup 
investigation, 79% of Americans supported a government stance to seriously control illegal 
immigrants. Moreover, in 1975, the New York Times called for employer sanctions because of 
the number of illegal immigrants coming to America to find good jobs; six to seven million 
illegal immigrants every year.92 
Edwin Harwood argues that in the early 1980s, the American public consistently 
expressed overwhelming opposition to illegal immigration, along with calls for strengthened 
enforcement actions by the government to stop the influx of illegal immigrants. Harwood 
references a May 1982 poll conducted by the Merit Survey, which reported that 84% of the 
public expressed concern about the number of illegal aliens in the country. Moreover, Harwood 
identifies an October 1977 Gallup poll, which revealed that 72% of the public agreed that 
penalties should be imposed on businesses that hire illegal aliens.  According to Harwood, when 
Gallup asked the same question again in October 1983, the percentage agreeing had risen to 
79%.93  Furthermore, Harwood argues that in the 1980s, the American public was “decidedly 
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cool” to the idea of granting amnesty. Harwood identified an October 1983 Gallup poll which 
found that only 41% of the American public supported permanent resident status for illegal 
aliens who had lived at least six years in the United States, while 52% of the public expressed 
opposition.94 
Harwood also references a June 1984 survey by Gallup which found that 55% of 
Americans opposed amnesty for illegal aliens, compared with only 35% saying they favoured 
legalizing the status of illegal aliens. Harwood argues that Gallup’s findings were almost 
identical to the June 1984 Newsweek poll, which found only 34% of the public supporting 
amnesty for illegal aliens, compared with 55% who wanted illegal aliens arrested and deported.95  
Similarly, in a June 1986 Gallup poll, 35% of respondents indicated that immigration should be 
kept at its present level, 7% felt that immigration should be increased, 49% indicated that they 
believed immigration should be decreased, and 9% had no opinion.96  
 The literature in this case study reveals an American public that was very interested in the 
issue of immigration; particularly illegal immigration. This is in contrast to the 1965 case which 
indicated a very disinterested public (less than 1% interested in issue). However, in both cases 
the public were responsible for putting pressure on the government to enact change in legislation 
regarding immigration; in 1965 they wanted an end to the quota system, and in 1986 they wanted 
a solution to the problem of illegal immigration. In both cases, the result was controversial 
legislation enacted through bipartisan compromises in response to this pressure for action. 
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Chapter Summary: 
In 1986 there was consensus by lawmakers regarding the need for action, or some form 
of change; they realized they had to address the large numbers of illegal immigrants entering the 
United States.  In fact, in this case, as with 1965, there was evidence of polarization in Congress 
as reflected in the debates and arguments made either for or against the proposed 1986 bill.  The 
literature reveals that debates in the house were particularly contentious, as there was resistance 
to IRCA based on the perception that the amnesty program rewarded criminal behaviour with 
legalization. This situation is similar to the 2013 case – as we will see in Chapter IV; 
Republicans in the House of Representatives, like those in the 1986 Congress, were also strongly 
opposed to amnesty because they believed it rewarded criminal behaviour with legalization. 
Amnesty as a solution to the phenomenon of illegal immigration was first considered in the 1986 
Congress, and again in the 2013 Congress, as we will also see later. 
Moreover, although this bill passed in the Republican majority Senate, it initially failed in 
the Democratically-controlled House. There was resistance to this bill by business interests and 
civil rights organizations; both groups having their own motivations for resistance. In the end 
however, the bill passed after concessions were made to all the different interests; employer 
sanctions, amnesty for illegal immigrants, and increased border security. This resistance to the 
bill until concessions were made, supports Abramowitz’s theory that compromise had become 
more difficult over time. 
With regard to bipartisanship/compromise in this case study, the literature reveals that 
even though amnesty had never been considered by a US Congress previously, several amnesty 
proposals were designed in 1986 to address the phenomenon of large numbers of illegal 
immigrants as the least costly alternative; politically, financially, and administratively.  Similar 
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to the 1965 case, compromise occurred only when those demanding concessions were granted 
what they wanted; the imposition of a ceiling on the Western Hemisphere in 1965, and amnesty, 
stronger borders, and sanctions against employers in 1986. 
Unlike the 1965 case, which revealed that the majority of the American public were 
disinterested in immigration, the public in 1986 were very concerned with this issue; particularly 
illegal immigration. In fact, 84% expressed that they were concerned, while 79% supported a 
government stance to seriously address the issue. While the 1965 American public were 
concerned with racial discrimination and dismantling a discriminatory immigration system, the 
1986 American public were concerned with addressing illegal immigration, and its supposed 
consequences. 
The literature also reveals that in 1986, the American public “consistently expressed 
overwhelming opposition to illegal immigration,” and wanted lawmakers to strengthen 
enforcement efforts to stop the incursion of illegal immigrants. IRCA was in fact legislation in 
response to the wishes of most American citizens who feared that illegal immigrants were taking 
away their jobs and sharing public benefits. The new legislation seemed responsive to the wishes 
of the people, as was the case in 1965. Moreover, the sanctions against employers in this bill 
were reflective of the sentiment among the public that employers were hiring illegal immigrants 
at the expense of American workers. It can be argued therefore, that public opinion seemed to 
have a significant effect on lawmaking in 1986. It is interesting to note however, that although 
the majority of the American public was overwhelmingly negative towards illegal immigration in 
1986, and the majority indicated that they were against amnesty for illegal immigrants, Congress 
nevertheless passed IRCA, which granted amnesty to nearly 2.7 million individuals. This 
	 52	
legislation seems to be in direct conflict with the wishes expressed by the American people – 
55% opposed amnesty for illegal aliens. 
It should be noted that the 1986 case study reveals some evidence of polarization within 
the Republican party itself, which suggests the presence of an ideological division among party 
members. One can argue that this division was in response to what can be viewed as liberal 
Republicans within the party in 1986; support for a bill providing a “path to citizenship” for 
illegal immigrants could have separated the more right-wing Republicans from the more 
moderate liberal Republicans in the 99th Congress. This polarization within the Republican party 
is in contrast to the 89th Congress in which the majority of Republicans voted the same way, 
revealing no conflict or extremism within the party. Another point to note in the 1986 case study 
is that illegal immigration was the focus of the 99th Congress, which is different from the 1965 
case which did not have to address illegal immigration as an issue. In fact, scholars like Marinari 
suggests that the issue of illegal immigration was a direct consequence of the prohibitions of the 
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.   
The next section, Chapter IV, is an examination of the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act to determine the role of the variables on this 
legislation, which was unsuccessful. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY:  
BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2013 
“Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) joined Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham 
(R-SC), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Robert Menendez (D-
NJ) and Michael Bennet (D-CO) to introduce S. 744, the "Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013." The bill's introduction supposedly 
marked a first step toward achieving the strongest border security and enforcement measures in 
US history, modernizing the legal immigration system to encourage economic growth and job 
creation, and ending the current de facto amnesty by dealing with the undocumented immigrant 
population in a tough, but fair way that was directly linked to achieving several security 
triggers.”97 These Senators became known as the “Gang of Eight.” The 113th Congress, consisted 
of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives, and a Democratic majority in the 
Senate. It should be noted that this is in contrast to both the 89th and 99th Congresses; the 89th 
Congress consisted of a Democratic majority in both the Senate and House, while the 99th 
Congress consisted of a Republican majority in the Senate and a Democratic House majority.  
Marco Rubio issued the following statement after the bill’s introduction: "Our 
immigration system is broken, and the status quo of having 11 million undocumented people 
living under de facto amnesty will only continue if we do nothing to solve this problem. This bill 
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marks the beginning of an important debate, and I believe it will fix our broken system by 
securing our borders, improving interior enforcement, modernizing our legal immigration to help 
create jobs and protect American workers, and dealing with our undocumented population in a 
tough, but humane way that is fair to those trying to come here the right way and linked to 
achieving several security triggers.”98   
The Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 
provided for border security, legalization, interior enforcement, and reforms to non-immigrant 
visa programs. Title I of the Act provided for border security measures that would achieve and 
maintain effective control in high risk areas of the southern border. This included the 
development and implementation of a fencing plan, an E-verify system, and a biographic entry-
exit system at air and sea ports. The bill appropriated $3 billion for this plan which would 
include technology, personnel, and other resources. Title II of the Act provided a path to 
citizenship for the 11.5 undocumented immigrants in the United States. It would establish a new 
framework for future legal immigration by revamping the current family and employment-based 
systems and creating two additional merit-based immigration systems. Title III would mandate 
that E-verify provide additional worker protections, reform the immigration court system and 
provide additional measures related to interior enforcement.  Finally, Title IV would reform the 
current non-immigrant visa programs and create a new worker visa that would meld greater 
employer flexibility with worker protections and the ability to apply for permanent residence.”99 
                                               
    98 Marco Rubio. U.S. Congress. Senate. “Rubio & Colleagues Introduce The Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity & Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.” Congressional Documents and Publications. Washington: 
Federal Information & News Dispatch Inc., 2013.   
    99 Chuck Schumer et al., U.S. Congress. Senate. “Summary of Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.” Congressional Documents and Publications. Washington: Federal 
Information & News Dispatch Inc., 2013. 
	 55	
Partisan Polarization: 
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL), a senior member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
introduced the House Safe Act as an amendment to The Border Security, Economic Opportunity 
and Immigration Modernization Act on June 19, 2013.  This amendment provided crucial 
resources to ICE officers and contained reforms that would improve public safety and help 
establish a lawful immigration system.  Sessions believed that the original bill included 
provisions that would collectively weaken interior enforcement.  According to Sessions, "Much 
of the focus to date on the security flaws in the Gang of Eight plan have centered around the fact 
that it provides immediate amnesty without border security. Less discussed, however, is how the 
Gang of Eight plan decimates future immigration enforcement inside our borders.” According to 
Sessions, the Gang of Eight plan would not only effectively create an immediate amnesty for 
those in the US illegally today, but a permanent de facto amnesty for future illegal aliens who 
arrive tomorrow.100  
 In an April 2013 News Release, Washington DC Congressman Steve King released the 
following statement in response to the comprehensive immigration bill introduced by the Senate 
"Gang of Eight:"   
"The Gang of Eight's bill is aggressive and outrageous amnesty," said King, "It is instant 
legalization of all illegal immigrants in the United States, with very few exceptions. It contains 
only promises: the promise of a plan for border security, of a backup plan for the border security, 
and of workplace enforcement in the form of making E-Verify mandatory. What makes anyone 
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think President Obama would enforce any future immigration laws when he has violated his own 
oath of office to take care that the laws be 'faithfully executed?' I expected this from Democrats 
who have long understood their brand of more taxes, more borrowing, and more government 
giveaways, and know how to sell it. It is the Republicans who should know better. Republicans 
who support this bill have effectively said to Americans, 'we are prepared to sacrifice the Rule of 
Law on the altar of misguided and erroneous political expediency.'"101 
Furthermore, Sen. Mike Lee, (R-Utah), who claimed strong Tea Party backing, was 
initially part of the bipartisan Senate talks but ultimately backed out, saying he agreed with a 
majority of the plan's principles, but could not support what he saw as a special path to 
citizenship for people who broke the law. Kaplan also identifies Sen. Ted Cruz, (R-Texas), who 
said he was interested in “beefing up” border security and fixing the legal immigration system, 
but not a plan that contained a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants.102 On the other hand, 
the plan received praise from individuals such as Sen. Chris Coons (D-DEL), a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. Coons referred to the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act as a comprehensive immigration reform bill that made important 
strides toward repairing America’s broken immigration system. Senator Coons said the bill was a 
balanced, bipartisan one that would make the US immigration system fairer and more humane, 
would provide new opportunities for American-educated immigrants to pursue their ideas and 
innovations in the US, and it would “make extraordinary investments” in the security of 
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borders.103   
The 2013 Congress was very polarized on the issue of immigration and the best strategies 
to fix a system that all agreed is broken. While the “Gang of Eight” ideas seemed to hold merit 
across parties, in Congress, Republicans - particularly in the House - remained staunchly 
opposed to, and unwilling to compromise on any strategies that included amnesty for illegal 
immigrants.  Moreover, some Republicans went as far as berating other Republicans for even 
considering this as an option. In fact, some Republican members of Congress indicated their 
support for this legislation until amnesty became a factor, at which point support was withdrawn. 
This was in direct contrast to the view of Democratic members of Congress who felt that this bill 
made significant strides towards repairing the broken system.  The failure of the 2013 Congress 
to pass this legislation, unlike the cases of 1965 and 1986, suggests that as Abramowitz contends, 
partisan polarization has increased over the years, thus making compromise and bipartisanship 
more difficult in 2013 than it was in 1986 and 1965.  
Examination of congressional voting data in 2013 also reveals that there was polarization 
in Congress on this issue. The vote to pass S. 744 – the Border Security, Economic Opportunity 
and Immigration Modernization Act – in the Senate showed that all Democrats voted in favour 
of this bill, while a majority of Republicans voted against it. Furthermore, in this case, like in 
1986, the Republican vote revealed some polarization within the party on this issue, with the 
votes split 32-14 against the bill (the 14 Senators voting with Democrats in bipartisan solidarity). 
The bill, however, passed in the Senate 69-32.  This is illustrated below: 
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Table 5 shows the vote to pass S. 744 – the Border Security, Economic Opportunity and 
Immigration Act in the 2013 Senate 
 All votes Independents Democrats Republicans 
Yea 69 2 53 14 
Nay 32 0 0 32 
 
The rise of the Tea Party is a phenomenon unique to the 2013 case that also has to be 
examined as a factor responsible for polarization in the 113th Congress, as one can argue that this 
group put pressure on Republicans to move more to the right ideologically. Scholars like 
Maxwell and Parent argue that protest activities highlighted by the popular media during this 
period suggests that Tea Party members were in opposition to a single symbol: Barack Obama, 
the first African-American president.  They argue that this observation and “the timing of the 
appearance of the movement (within weeks of Obama’s inauguration) could indicate that this 
movement represented an Obama backlash, as opposed to a new wave of fiscal conservatism,104 
as the movement purported. 
Furthermore, Patrick Fisher, who analyzed 2012 ANES data to compare the 
demographics and attitudes of Tea Party supporters to Republicans who did not support the Tea 
Party, states that “demographically, Tea Party supporters are whiter, older, more male, more 
religious, and more Southern than Republicans who did not identify themselves as members of 
the movement.” He argues that “not only are Tea Party supporters demographically different 
from Non-Tea Party Republicans, but there are significant ideological and policy preference 
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differences between the two groups as well. On virtually every issue analyzed, the issue positions 
of Tea Party supporters are more conservative, sometimes considerably so, than Non-Tea Party 
Republicans.”105  
Fisher also argues that “support for the Tea Party is motivated by something beyond the 
more conventional view of conservatism in which economic freedom and small government as 
well as social and fiscal responsibility are prized.”106 He also cites scholars Parker and Barreto 
(2013), “who argue that people who are attracted to the Tea Party are reactionary conservatives – 
that is, people who fear change that seems to undermine their way of life. It is thus similar to Ku 
Klux Klan of the 1920s and the John Birch Society of the 1950s and 1960s. The most important 
similarity of the Tea Party and these groups is the presence of change: the displacement of the 
white, Christian, male-dominated, native-born American.”107 
Similarly, Christopher S. Parker argues that “the Tea Party faction in the House of 
Representatives has roiled American politics. From the outset, the reactionaries of the right have 
refused to cooperate with the Obama Administration. Whether on health-care reform, financial 
reform, immigration reform, same-sex rights, or violence against women, the Tea Party has 
continued to resist legislative initiatives promulgated by the White House. Among many liberals, 
it has become accepted wisdom that such resistance to the President’s agenda is driven by the 
fear and racial anxiety evoked by his mere presence in the White House.”108 
Moreover, Ragusa and Gaspar argue that “the Tea Party’s emergence induced a 
conservative shift in the voting behaviour of its lawmakers.” They found that “representatives 
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who (1) joined the Tea Party Caucus and (2) had a large volume of Tea Party activists organized 
in their district underwent a significant shift to the right in their roll-call record in the 112th 
Congress.” In fact, they also found that “unlike Democrats and Non-Tea Party aligned 
Republicans who also shifted to the right or left in the 112th Congress, Tea Party Republicans 
did not “bounce back” in the 113th Congress.”109  This extreme right-wing movement is evident 
in the response of some Republicans to those who supported Democrats on the ‘Gang of Eight’ 
bill; they were seen as traitors by the more right-wing members of the Republican party.   
Furthermore, the literature implies that race, and a fear of change among conservative 
whites played a role in the resistance to compromise and polarization in the 2013 Congress. This 
may be a factor in explaining Republican’s strong opposition to the bipartisan bill. Racial 
undertones were also revealed in the 1965 Congress, which showed opposition to the legislation 
by conservatives and conservative leaning Southern Democrats who insisted on the imposition of 
a ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. This was seen as a measure to maintain 
the “nontraditional” sources of immigrants to the United States. In the 1965 case, these 
restrictionists blocked the bill until concessions were made. In the 2013 case however, 
Republicans were simply unwilling to compromise; they did not even demand concessions in 
return for their support. This phenomenon in the 2013 Congress not only provides a possible 
explanation for why immigration reform efforts failed, but also supports Abramowitz’s theory 
that over the years Republicans have moved more to the right ideologically, are more polarized 
than in previous years, and are also more unwilling to compromise than in past periods. 
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Bipartisanship: 
The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act was 
introduced in the Senate on April 16, 2013. On May 21st, the bill passed out of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on a vote of 13-5. Debate on the Senate floor began on June 7, 2013. 
Senators filed more than 500 amendments, but very few actually were offered on the floor, or 
voted upon due to filibusters. The bill as amended passed the Senate on June 27, 2013 by a vote 
of 69-32.110  
 There was clear compromise in the case of this 2013 bill, as the ‘Group of eight’ 
campaigned for a bipartisan effort to pass this legislation in the Senate. Even more noteworthy 
was the Republican display of bipartisanship when 14 Senators crossed the aisle to vote in 
solidarity with Democrats to ensure this bill passed in the Senate. Prior to the passing of this 
legislation, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) urged Senators to support a procedural motion to 
consider the bill: "The legislation before us is the result of a bipartisan group of Senators who 
came together and made an agreement," Leahy said of the Act, "What was initially a proposal 
from the so-called 'gang of eight' became, through the Committee process, the product of a group 
of 18, supported by a bipartisan majority of the Judiciary Committee. If Senators who have come 
together to help develop this bill keep their commitments, I have no doubt that we will be able to 
end this filibuster and pass this fair but tough legislation on comprehensive immigration 
reform."111 
Republicans in the House however, were not so accommodating. Many of them refused 
to consider this bill on the grounds that it disregarded rule of law and rewarded criminal 
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behaviour. They refused to compromise regarding the proposal for a pathway to citizenship. 
Consequently, no action has been taken on this bill since 2013, effectively rendering it dead. It 
can be argued therefore that ideological polarization in the House of Representatives, was 
responsible for this failed attempt at immigration reform. Furthermore, it can be argued that this 
polarization was centered on the issue of amnesty for illegal immigrants. This scenario is similar 
to the one experienced in the 1986 Congress where Republicans in the House were also strongly 
opposed to amnesty. Unlike the case of 1986 however, ultimately, House Republicans in the 
113th Congress were unwilling to compromise. This too, seems to support Abramowitz’s theory 
that over the years Congress has become more polarized, and that Republicans were mainly 
responsible for this polarization.  Additionally, this supports Abramowitz’s view that 
polarization in Congress makes it more difficult to compromise than in earlier years. This 2013 
case study supports Abramowitz’s position on this since, despite polarization, the Congresses of 
1965 and 1986 were able to find common ground to pass legislation.  
Friedman and Kaper argue that with Congress as divided as it has been in a century, 
partisanship was unpopular because it was blamed as the cause of the dysfunction in Congress. 
The ‘gang of eight,’ according to Friedman and Kaper, was popular because it was seen as an 
antidote to that partisan dysfunction. They say that the ‘Gang of Eight’ advertised the idea that 
the obstacle to good governance was process, not politics – that if lawmakers from both parties 
just talked together, they could fix things.112  
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT.), who was 
managing the bill on the floor, said the Republican amendment was part of the Senate's 
bipartisan process to passing comprehensive immigration reform.  Leahy admitted that the bill as 
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amended would not have been one that he would have drafted. However, he claimed to support 
the amendment because he believed it would increase Republican support for the legislation. 
According to Leahy, the bipartisan immigration reform bill would unite families and provide a 
legal pathway to citizenship for millions of individuals. He also believed that it would 
address the nation's labour needs and provide reasonable reforms to support refugees and asylum 
seekers.  Leahy urged Senators to come together to support the bill to fix a broken immigration system 
that hurts all Americans.113  While in principle Democrats and Republicans were willing to compromise 
to fix an immigration system that both sides agree is broken, this bipartisanship ended at amnesty. The 
113th Congress, in 2013, was too ideologically divided on this issue to actually find consensus to enact 
legislation.   
Public Opinion/Attitudes: 
According to the Pew Research Center, despite the political rhetoric emanating from 
Washington, and press reports of an immigration deal shaping up in the US Senate in 2013, US 
immigration reform was not a priority for many Americans – especially some in the Republican 
Party.  Pew Research Center states that despite the political impetus behind immigration reform, 
such change still faced an uphill fight with the American public; Americans were much more 
interested in seeing Washington strengthen the economy and cut the budget deficit. Pew 
contends that “this relative disinterest may accord added leverage to many Republicans who 
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remain troubled by the cultural implications of greater immigration and do not support an easier 
path to citizenship.”114 
Bruce Stokes argues that immigration reform became a front burner issue in Washington 
during this period because in the 2012 election, 10% of American voters were Hispanics and 
71% of them voted for Obama. Moreover, Stokes argues that Asian Americans, who account for 
only 3% of the electorate but are the most rapidly growing minority group, gave 73% of their 
votes to the “Democratic standard bearer.” Stokes maintains that with their party drawing an 
overwhelming share of its support from whites in 2012, while nearly half of the Democratic 
Party was comprised of ethnic minorities, Republican candidates needed to attract immigrant 
voters. 
According to another Pew Research Center survey, seven-in-ten Americans say there 
should be a way for people in the United States illegally to remain in the country if they met 
certain requirements. But only 43% thought they should be allowed to apply for citizenship. 
According to Stokes, another survey showed that immigration reform was simply not a top 
priority for most Americans; a little over half thought the federal budget crisis was the most 
essential issue for the president and Congress to act on in 2013.  Only 16% accorded that priority 
to immigration reform. The same survey found that while 70% of the public said that it was 
essential to pass a major deficit reduction bill in 2013, only half of the public believed it was 
crucial to enact major immigration legislation. Moreover, Americans disagree on the details of 
what should be contained in that legislation. Just a quarter say the priority should be given to 
creating a way for illegal immigrants already in the country to become citizens if they met 
certain requirements, while almost half think equal weight should be given to better border 
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security and stronger enforcement of immigration laws.  Only 11% of Republicans saw a path to 
citizenship as the most important issue, while 43% said it was tighter border security.115  
In a March 2013 Gallup poll which asked Americans how much they personally worry 
about illegal immigration, 37% of respondents indicated that they worried about it a great deal, 
23% worried about it a fair amount, 26% worried about it only a little, and 14% indicated they 
did not worry about it at all. Similarly, in a June 2013 Gallup poll, 40% of respondents felt that 
immigration should be kept at its present level, 23% felt that immigration should be increased, 
and 35% indicated that they believed immigration should be decreased. Only 2% of respondents 
had no opinion. Another June 2013 Gallup Poll revealed that 5% of Americans were very 
satisfied with the current level of immigration into the country, 31% were somewhat satisfied, 
25% somewhat dissatisfied, 31% very dissatisfied, and 8% had no opinion. Asked of those 
dissatisfied with the current level of immigration, whether they would like to see this level 
increased, decreased, or remain about the same, 5% wanted an increase, 35% wanted a decrease, 
16% wanted it to remain the same, and 8% had no opinion.116  
Another June 2013 Gallup poll revealed that 72% of Americans thought immigration was 
a good thing for the country, 25% thought it was a bad thing, 2% had a mixed response, and 1% 
had no opinion. A June 2013 Gallup poll asking what the main focus of the US government 
should be in dealing with the issue of immigration revealed that 41% of Americans favoured 
halting the flow of illegal immigrants, 55% favoured government developing a plan to deal with 
immigrants currently in the US illegally, and 4% had no opinion. Furthermore, when asked how 
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important it was to them that the government take steps that year to deal with developing a plan 
to deal with the large number of illegal immigrants already living in the US, a June 2011 Gallup 
poll revealed that 43% of respondents believed this was extremely important, 38% thought it was 
very important, 13% said moderately important, 5% said it was not that important, and 1% had 
no opinion.117 
Moreover, a June 2013 Gallup poll revealed that 83% of Americans favoured tightening 
security at the borders as part of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration, 16% 
opposed it, and 1% had no opinion. Another June 2013 Gallup Poll revealed that 84% of adults 
surveyed favoured requiring business owners to check the immigration status of workers they 
hire as part of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration, 16% opposed, and 1% had 
no opinion. Similarly, as part of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration, 76% of 
adults surveyed in a June 2013 Gallup poll favoured expanding the number of short term work 
visas for immigrants whose job skills are needed in the US, 23% opposed it, and 1% had no 
opinion. Also, as part of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration, a June 2013 
survey of adults revealed that 88% of Americans favoured allowing illegal immigrants already in 
the country the opportunity to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements over a 
period of time, including paying taxes and a penalty, passing a criminal background check and 
learning English, while 12% of Americans opposed it.  
Another June 2013 survey which asked respondents which political party’s policies on 
immigration and immigration reform come closer to their own – the Democratic party, or the 
Republican party -  48% of respondents said they aligned more closely with the policies of the 
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Democratic party, while 36% said they aligned more closely with the policies of the Republican 
party. 1% aligned with both equally, 9% aligned with neither party, and 7% had no opinion.118 
Moreover, a 2012 survey administered by the American National Election Studies (ANES) 
revealed that 14% of Americans saw themselves as independent, 24% felt they were leaning 
independent, 28% said they felt weak partisanship, while 34% said they felt strong 
partisanship.119 
This data suggests that in 2013, the American public, as Susan Martin argues, seemed 
ambivalent about immigration reform. On one hand, they seemed disinterested in the issue as one 
poll indicated that only 16% thought this issue was a priority. Moreover, although only 37% 
indicated that they worried about illegal immigration a great deal, 55% favoured government 
developing a plan to deal with illegal immigrants currently in the United States. In fact, 43% said 
it was extremely important that this plan be developed in 2013. These figures suggest that the 
American public were quite concerned with illegal immigration in 2013 (not as concerned as the 
1986 public, but still significantly concerned). Furthermore, 83% of Americans favoured 
tightening the borders, and 84% favoured requiring business owners to check immigration status 
of workers as part of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration.  
Ironically, all these concerns were addressed in the ‘Gang of Eight’ plan which failed to 
receive support in the 2013 House of Representatives. Does this suggest a disconnect with 
Congress and the wishes of the American people in 2013? It does however, support 
Abramowitz’s theory that Republicans in Congress have become so ideologically polarized that 
they simply refuse to compromise, even when it may be possible to reach consensus. One can 
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argue though, that it is a possibility that this ambivalence regarding immigration reform may be a 
factor in the ‘Gang of Eight’s’ failed reform effort; there seems to have been no pressure from 
the American public in 2013 to influence lawmakers’ decision. This is a different scenario from 
the 1965 and 1986 cases, where lawmakers were heavily pressured for reform by the people, 
leading to compromises which resulted in legislation.  
 
Chapter Summary: 
In 2013, lawmakers felt that the immigration system was due for an overhaul, and efforts 
were made to reform the system. Like in 1965 and 1986 however, there was evidence of 
ideological polarization. While the “Gang of Eight” initiative was supported by Democrats and 
some Republicans in the Senate, Republicans in the House strongly opposed it; mainly because 
of the inclusion of a “path to citizenship” for undocumented immigrants. Although the “Gang of 
Eight” framed the bill as a bipartisan effort at immigration reform to show the public that reform 
was possible if political parties put their differences aside, as Abramowitz contends, party loyalty 
had become much more powerful in contemporary America than these lawmakers realized.  
Moreover, Republicans opposing the proposal sharply criticized those Republicans supporting 
the bill, in effect calling them traitors to the party.  This loyalty, both to party and ideology, was 
also more powerful than the bipartisan show of the “Gang of Eight.” 
Interestingly, the 1986 case study revealed evidence of what seems like the emergence of 
a division within the Republican party on the issue of immigration. This split is also evident in 
the 2013 case as Republicans publicly expressed their displeasure with party members 
supporting the bipartisan bill.  Abramowitz’s theory supports this as he argues that over the 
years, Republicans have been moving more and more to the ideological right. In fact, this split 
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seems to confirm that the more right-wing members of the Republican party were putting 
pressure on its more moderate members to move further right, in effect discouraging the 
presence of liberal Republicans, which was revealed to be present in the 1986 case study.  
It is also important to note that while the 89th and 113th Congresses were similar in that both 
revealed the presence of bipartisan groups working towards a common goal - the group of 
Conservatives and Southern Democrats in 1965, and the ‘Gang of Eight’ in 2013 - the 113th 
Congress in this study is unique in that it also included the presence of the Tea Party which may 
be a factor in the failure of the 2013 Congress to pass legislation on immigration reform.             
The literature reveals that this group may have been a reaction to Barack Obama. In 
addition, it shows that the Tea Party faction in the House of Representatives has refused to 
cooperate with the Obama administration from the outset, regardless of the issue, and has 
resisted legislative initiatives promoted by the White House. It also revealed that Tea Party 
supporters are whiter, older, more male, more religious, and more Southern than Republicans 
who did not identify themselves as members of the movement. Moreover, Tea Party supporters 
are more conservative on all issues. The 2013 case study clearly shows a decrease in the number 
of moderates in the 113th Congress, supporting Abramowitz’s argument that moderates have 
continued to disappear over the years. 
Furthermore, scholars Parker and Barreto (2013) argue that people who are attracted to 
the Tea Party are reactionary conservatives – those who fear change that seems to undermine 
their way of life. He likens this group to the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and the John Birch 
Society of the 1950s and 1960s highlighting the most important similarity of the Tea Party and 
these groups as the presence of change: the displacement of the white, Christian, male-
dominated, native-born American. The literature also reveals that the Tea Party’s emergence 
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induced a conservative shift in the voting behaviour of its lawmakers who continued to maintain 
their stance in the 113th Congress. This extreme right-wing movement is evident in the response 
of more conservative Republicans to those who supported Democrats on the ‘Gang of Eight’ bill; 
they were seen as traitors by the more right-wing members of the Republican party.   
The literature in this case study revealed that the American public seemed ambivalent 
about immigration reform in 2013. On one hand, they seemed disinterested in the issue with only 
16% citing it as a priority, while on the other, polls carried out revealed what seemed to be 
interest in the issue; particularly regarding illegal immigration. A significant percentage of 
Americans indicated they were worried about illegal immigration and supported a government 
plan to address the issue in 2013. This leads to questions about whether or not ambivalence 
among the American people played a role in the demise of the 2013 “Gang of Eight” plan. This 
ambivalence certainly seems to have been reflected in the response to the plan by the public 
which did not put any pressure on the government to enact change, as was the case in both 1965 
and 1986.  In both these Congresses, legislation enacted was reflective of public sentiment.  
The literature also reveals that 48% of Americans indicated that their views more closely 
aligned with that of the Democratic party on the issue of immigration and immigration reform, 
while 36% indicated that their views more closely aligned with that of the Republican party on 
these issues. This suggests some polarization among the American public on the issue of 
immigration, as purported by Abramowitz. Is it possible that Abramowitz was also right about 
polarization in Congress being reflective of a division among the American people? 
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      CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 This study reveals that partisan polarization does in fact play a significant role in the 
inability of lawmakers in the United States to address comprehensive immigration reform. The 
case studies explain that although partisan polarization has always been a factor in the 
lawmaking process in Congress, before 2013, this did not prevent lawmakers from working 
together to pass legislation.  In 2013 however, polarization does seem to be a factor. It is 
plausible therefore, that the parties have become more polarized over the years. As Abramowitz 
and other scholars in the literature have posited, this polarization in Congress is the reason 
lawmakers have been unable to compromise on many issues, including immigration reform. The 
cases examined in this study, particularly the 2013 case, strongly support the argument that 
partisan polarization has affected lawmakers’ ability to address comprehensive immigration 
reform in the United States today.  Moreover, this study reveals that for the most part, 
Abramowitz’s theory does provide a plausible explanation for why US lawmakers have 
seemingly found it impossible to enact legislation on immigration, particularly given the large 
number of illegal immigrants currently living in the US.   
In addition, this study supports Abramowitz’s position that the dramatic decline of 
moderates in Congress has made bipartisan compromise much more difficult than it was in the 
past. All three cases confirmed the presence of moderates in the Congresses under investigation; 
it can be argued that their presence in the Congresses of 1965 and 1986 may have played a 
significant role in influencing lawmakers’ decisions and their willingness to compromise to enact 
immigration legislation.  Although moderates were also present in the 2013 Senate, their 
presence was not significant enough to influence decision making or inspire bipartisanship in the 
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House of Representatives to successfully pass the ‘Gang of Eight’ bill. This however, further 
confirms Abramowitz’s view that the level of polarization had increased so much between the 
Congress of 1965 and that of 2013 that it made compromise more difficult, even though 
moderates – particularly in the Senate - attempted to create a situation conducive to consensus. 
Consequently, the study supports the view that it has become increasingly difficult for US 
lawmakers to compromise over the years. 
Abramowitz also posits that the Republican party is more responsible for the increase in 
ideological polarization than the Democratic party, as it has shifted more rightward than the 
Democratic party has shifted leftward. This is especially supported by the 1986 and 2013 cases; 
in 1986 it was Republicans in the House who opposed amnesty and demanded concessions for 
voting for the IRCA bill. Similarly, in 2013, it was Republicans in the House who has rendered 
the ‘Gang of Eight’ bill a dead initiative. Even in the 1965 case, in which opposition was led by 
conservative Democrats, it was their conservative views that made an alignment with 
Republicans possible to demand that a ceiling be imposed on immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere. This supports the argument that ideologically, Republicans were more polarized 
than Democrats, who in all three cases were seemingly more willing to compromise.  
This position is further supported by the rise of the Tea Party in 2008-2009, which one 
can argue was in response to what was seen as a threat to the status quo for a white, male-
dominated American society. This group’s presence was proven to have significantly influenced 
lawmakers’ positions and decisions on issues before the Congress.  In fact, it can be argued that 
this conservative group put pressure on members of the Republican party to move further to the 
right, splitting the party between its more conservative Tea Party supporters, and non-Tea Party 
Republicans. Consequently, lawmaking decisions in the Congress of 2013 reflected a situation of 
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a divided Republican party putting pressure on its own members to make more right-wing 
decisions, as opposed to a situation of Democrats versus Republicans. This was clearly depicted 
in the 2013 case where members of the Republican party were berated for even considering the 
‘Gang of Eight’ bill, which included a ‘path to citizenship’ for illegal immigrants. This division 
within the Republican party makes compromise even more elusive.  
 The study also reveals that public opinion was in fact an important factor in the first two 
case studies – 1965 and 1986. In both cases, legislation was enacted in response to pressure 
being put on Congress by members of the public to address the issue at hand; a discriminatory 
system in 1965 and large numbers of illegal immigrants in 1986. In 2013, however, the public 
seemed ambivalent toward the issue and there is no evidence in the literature examined that any 
pressure was put on the 113th Congress to make a decision regarding immigration reform. In fact, 
after members of the House refused to support the ‘Gang of Eight’ bill in 2013, it simply died.  
Based on the literature and statistical data reviewed during this study, there was no evidence to 
indicate that the public became more divided on the issue of immigration over time. Although  
there was some evidence of polarization among the American people in some opinion polls 
examined, their general position on the issue over time seems consistent. Furthermore, while 
there was some evidence to support Abramowitz’s view that the ideological divide existing 
between Democrats and Republicans reflects the existence of deep divisions within American 
society, the scope of this study did not allow extensive examination of data that could 
conclusively support this argument.   
It was very clear from this study however, that conservatives in America – especially in 
Congress - remain resistant to compromise on the issue of amnesty. Whether or not these 
lawmakers are simply representing the more polarized views of their constituents on the issue of 
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immigration remains an area for future research. Nevertheless, it has proven to be a polarizing 
issue over the last few decades, making it clear that at least some Americans seem averse to the 
idea of providing a “path to citizenship” for the millions of illegal immigrants in the US. 
Considering this, the probability of immigration reform appears low. This does not mean 
however, that immigration reform is impossible. It is possible that as the face of America 
changes, so too will the face of Congress. That is, conservative voters become outnumbered by 
liberal voters, as more immigrants and children of immigrants make up not only the electorate, 
but Congress as well. It is possible then that there will be enough consensus to enact immigration 
reform. However, as long as conservatives adhere to their ideologies and vote accordingly, it will 
be very difficult to change immigration policy given the current political system in the United 
States. 
Finally, I acknowledge that variables other than the ones examined in this study, such as 
interest groups, do have an effect on lawmakers’ ability to act in Congress. However, given the 
scope of this study, all possible factors could not be examined. Moreover, since this major paper 
relied mainly on secondary data, some information was not readily available for examination. I 
also acknowledge some overlapping with partisan polarization and bipartisanship as variables – 
in some instances, these variables were inevitably tied together.  I would like to see future studies 
in this area focus on the relationship between immigration reform and ethnic groups to determine 
how perceptions of immigrants – particularly from racialized groups - affect voting patterns in 
the United States. 
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